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Exemption Under the Antitrust Laws for Joint
Employer Activity
Leonard L. Scheinholtz*
Kenneth C. Kettering**
Mr. Gold has just finished a very lucid exposition of the current
state of the law with regard to antitrust challenges to joint activities or agreements among employees acting alone - that is, not in
concert with employers or other non-labor groups. I am going to
talk about the mirror image of that topic - antitrust challenges to
joint activities or agreements by employers acting alone and not in
concert with employees. At the end of this talk, I shall also touch
briefly on the recent NationalContractorsAssociation v. National
Electrical Contractors Association case,' which considered an
agreement between a set of employers and a union that has a special relationship to the integrity of multi-employer collective
bargaining.
Preparing a talk on this subject is a little like preparing a talk on
exobiology. Exobiology, as you may know, is the science of the biology of life that did not originate on Earth. Dozens of serious scientific papers on exobiology are printed every year. The problem is
that exobiology is a science that does not really exist. Nobody has
yet discovered any life that did not originate on Earth, and so all
of those papers only try to guess at what it might look like if and
when we do find some. In the same way, the law of antitrust as it
pertains to joint employer activities not in concert with labor unions, as yet, hardly exists. Only a couple of dozen lower court cases
have considered the subject thus far. Even the commentators have
pretty much ignored it, except for a short section in Professor
Areeda's fine antitrust treatise2 and a couple of student notes.'
* Partner, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

* Associate, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. 678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982).
2. P. AREDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrrusT LAW 11 229d, 338, 339 (1978).
3. Note, Antitrust Law in the Labor-Management Context: The Employer as Defendant and the Union as Plaintiff, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 385 (1980); Note, Cooperative Collective Bargaining Conduct Among Trade Competitors and The Nonstatutory Labor Exemp-
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Most of the familiar Supreme Court cases on labor-antitrust Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, InternationalBrotherhood of Elec5 Local 189,
trical Workers,4 United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.' and Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 1007 are distinguishable in a fundamental way. All involved an agreement, or an
attempt to obtain an agreement, between a union and an employer
or some other business enterprise. Each such agreement would
have prejudiced the interests of some other firm. The perceived
danger in each case was that the union and the agreeing firms
could or did gang up in an illegitimate way against that other firm.
The problem was that the union concededly had a monopoly in at
least one limited area, the labor of the employees it represented,
and so the court's task was to distinguish legitimate use of that
monopoly power from illegitimate extension or use of that power.
That is not the case with regard to joint employer activity not in
concert with a union. Without an agreement between a union and
an employer, the danger of illegitimate extension or use of the monopoly power of a union is absent. The injured party will be the
firms' employees, not another firm. The problem is not defining
the limits of one type of collusion that is concededly legitimate in
some spheres, but rather deciding whether this type of collusion is
legitimate at all.
The closest analogy from among the Supreme Court's best
known excursions into labor-antitrust may be its earliest, the Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader8 and the United States v. Hutcheson9 cases,
both of which analyzed the legality under the Sherman Act of joint
employee activity not in concert with an employer - the mirror
image of this situation. There too, the Court's main inquiry was
whether joint action should be allowed at all; the Court did not
simply draw lines around a concededly legitimate union monopoly.
But this analogy is probably not a very helpful one, because the
situation is not really symmetric for employers and employees.
All of the relevant labor laws - the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 10 section From Antitrust Liability, 9
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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tions 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act,1 1 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 12 - were enacted for the benefit of employees,
not employers. To be meaningful, those statutes require implication of antitrust immunity for broad classes of joint employee activity. But those statutes do not require immunity for joint employer activity, except where such an immunity necessarily derives
from the exemption for employees - that is, except where such
immunity is necessary to make effective the employees' immunity,
or otherwise to make collective bargaining work.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court has never decided any
labor-antitrust cases involving only joint employer activity. It has,
twice, but not very much juice can be squeezed from those two
3 decided in 1957,
cases. Radovich v. National Football League,"
held that a football player blacklisted by the National Football
League for breaking his contract had a cause of action against the
league under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.4 In Anderson v.
Shipowners Association,"5 decided in 1926, the Court affirmed a
judgment in favor of a seaman who challenged, under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, a trade association's unilateral establishment of
an employment registry and joint fixing of seamen's wages. In
Radovich, however, the Court was mainly concerned with rejecting
the extension of the baseball exemption to football; and it gave
practically no analysis of the claim otherwise. In particular, the
Court did not clarify the extent to which its decision depended on
the fact that the employers were alleged to have conspired to restrict competition in the product market (the market for football
exhibitions) as well as in the labor market (the market for football
players' services).
In any case, the flood of antitrust litigation by players against
professional sports leagues in the past ten years has established
that a sports league is a single joint .venture, not an association of
competitors - a gloss that renders such cases of slight precedent
for joint employer action between competitors. Furthermore, no
union was on the scene in Radovich, and so the Court did not consider any possible exemption for concerted activities by employers
in the context of labor-management relations. Anderson, though it
may be good precedent today, was decided before the enactment of
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

29 U.S.C. §§
29 U.S.C. §§
352 U.S. 445
15 U.S.C. §§
272 U.S. 359

17, 52 (1976).
151-69.
(1957).
151-69 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
(1926).
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the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the creation of the labor exemption therefrom in the Hutcheson case.
We will soon get some important material to work with from the
Supreme Court, however. On January 11, 1982, the Court granted
certiorari in the California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General Contractors of California" case. For the first time
the Court will have to consider whether there is antitrust immunity for joint employer activity against commercial firms outside
the bargaining unit where there is an ultimate labor-related objective. Keep in mind, therefore, that what I say today may very well
be obsolete in six months.
If I may return to my exobiology metaphor for a moment, consider that the scientific way of handling a new and difficult problem is to break it down to a simpler problem that we can analyze,
and then gradually add more factors. That is the best way to approach this subject, because it breaks neatly into two categories.
The first category of joint employer activities, and the simplest
to analyze, is that which takes place outside the collective bargaining context and which has nothing to do with the collective bargaining process. The purest example of this would be agreement
among nonunion employers to fix or regulate wage rates, or an
agreement fixing other terms and conditions of employment. Another example would be a concerted refusal to deal with certain
employees or certain types of employees. Allegations of such concerted behavior have cropped up in many forms. For example,
there have been challenges to the blacklisting of employees for alleged political reasons, for union activity, and even for commercial
reasons, - e.g., where the blacklist is designed to prevent key employees from taking their expertise and contacts to another firm, or
to punish individuals who threaten to blow the whistle on employers' joint antitrust violations or other illegal activity. Off to one
side within the category of concerted refusals to deal, and probably
sui generis, are the cases that have considered various professional
sports league restrictions on players, such as ethical rules, reserve
clauses, and player draft provisions.
There is a split in authority as to whether there is something
special about the labor market, apart from consideration of collective bargaining, that would exempt such pure joint employer restraints in the labor market from the antitrust laws.
16.

648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
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Many cases dealing with joint employer activity where there is a
union involved have applied an antitrust exemption on the broad
ground that the antitrust laws apply only to restraints in a business market. 17 Such cases are fond of quoting a passage from one
of Professor Cox's articles on labor-antitrust: "No one seriously
suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the labor
market per se."' is
On the other hand, cases dealing with joint employer activity affecting the labor market where no union is involved have generally
denied any antitrust exemption to the employers. 1 The activity
may well be found to be legal, but not because it is exempt from
scrutiny under the antitrust laws. Usually these cases state that
the exemption for joint activity in the labor market extends only to
joint employee activity, not joint employer activity.
The theory that the labor market is completely exempt from antitrust scrutiny has some merit. The first sentence of section 6 of
the Clayton Act flatly says, "[T]he labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce." It does not say that it is an
article of commerce as to the employer but not the employee.
Moreover, this theory finds support in the broad language of some
of the Supreme Court's cases on labor-antitrust in other contexts.
For example, in the Apex Hosiery case,2 0 which involved an antitrust challenge by an employer to a union's sitdown strike and sabotage, the Court said without qualification: "[Tihis Court has
never applied the Sherman Act in any case whether or not involving labor organizations or activities unless the Court was of the
opinion that there was some form of restraint upon commercial
17. See, e.g., Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
431 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); Kennedy v. Long
Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 372-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963); Amalgamated
Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
252, 254 (1955).
19. See, e.g., Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), later opinion
sub nom. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978); Attemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Cesnick v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967). See generally
Annot., 2 A.L.R. FED. 839 (1969). But see Taterka v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 862
(E.D. Wisc. 1975), af'd mem., 559 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924
(1977).
20. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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competition in the marketing of goods or services . .2.1." Furthermore, there is support in the legislative history of the Clayton
Act for this theory. There are several references in the floor debates, albeit rather general ones, to several legislators' views that
22
the Act would apply to employers as well as to employees.
The opposing view, that the exemption for the labor market as
such applies only to employees and not employers, can be supported from the very same kinds of sources, however. For example,
although the first sentence of section 6 flatly excludes labor from
"commerce," the second and much longer sentence deals exclusively and specifically with the rights of labor unions, and it is easy
to read the first sentence as an attempt to summarize the second.
Apex and the other Supreme Court cases containing broad language about the applicability of the antitrust laws only to commercial restraints were decided in contexts other than that of joint employer activity. Indeed, the Anderson case, which I mentioned at
the beginning of this talk, 3 was decided after the enactment of the
Clayton Act, yet held illegal a joint employer restraint in the product market. And of course, the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act were both passed primarily for the benefit of employees, not employers, and their legislative history is replete with
statements of that purpose.
As I mentioned before, this is one of the issues the Supreme
Court is faced with in Associated General Contractors.24 The appellants' brief and several amici strongly argue the proposition
that the labor market is per se exempt from the antitrust laws.
The Solicitor General, who submitted a brief at the Court's behest,
vigorously argues the contrary.
The second main category of joint employer activities-a step up
in complexity - is that which takes place in the context of collective bargaining. The results of the cases are generally unsurprising,
but it is not easy to extract coherent principles from them. At the
risk of being more dogmatic than the cases may justify, I think
that I can summarize where the law seems to be moving in six
propositions.
First, for antitrust purposes, there is nothing special about the
21. Id. at 493.
22. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 14,333 (Aug. 27, 1914) (remarks of Sen. Thomas); 51 CoNG.
REC. 14,366 (Aug. 28, 1914) (remarks of Sen. Smith); 51 CONG. REC. 16,279 (Oct. 7, 1914)
(remarks of Rep. Webb, floor manager).
23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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labor market, at least as regards joint employer activity that is
anti-competitive in that market. Even though section 6 of the
Clayton Act, literally read, removes the labor market completely
from the reach of the antitrust laws, that is proably not true. Section 6, as well as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the
Clayton Act, only apply to employee combinations, not employer
combinations. Employer combinations with regard to their employees, suppliers of labor, prima facie will probably be treated like
combinations with regard to suppliers of any other commodity. As
I have indicated, this is one of the primary issues before the Supreme Court in the Associated General Contractors case.
Second, the same basic principles that determine whether a supplier of goods to a firm has standing to challenge a particular restraint probably will be applied to determine whether an employee,
a supplier of services, has standing to challenge that restraint. A
loss of employment or potential employment or a reduction in
wages probably will be held an injury to "business or property"
within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Some cases
suggest, to the contrary, that an employee is not a victim of antitrust injury unless his job is such that he bears some entrepreneurial risk, but that idea seems aberrational and probably
will not survive. As with the first proposition, the Associated General Contractors case poses many of the issues associated with the
second propositon, and we may get some definitive answers soon.
These first two propositions are sufficient to answer most antitrust issues in any case arising outside of a collective bargaining
context. The third proposition is that there is a limited exemption
for joint employer activity that is within the context of collective
bargainingand limited to the labor market. Its core application is
the negotiation and execution of a collective bargaining agreement
within a multi-employer bargaining unit. It is a purely derivative
exemption, in the sense that it does not exist unless a valid union
which is itself exempt from antitrust scrutiny is on the other side
of the restrained labor market.
Fourth, the limits of this derivative exemption have never been
precisely defined. It seems clear that whatever is necessary to make
collective bargaining work is exempt. Although there are some aspects of the few decided cases that suggest narrower results,"
25. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 371
nied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963) (stresses that the strike insurance plan in
sive"); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 456 n.12
denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975) (strike insurance plan has no "coercive

n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. deissue is "purely defen(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
tendencies").
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courts seem to have accepted what I consider to be the most sensible approach: they exempt any joint employer restraints in the labor market that are both (a) no broader than the union on the
other side of the labor market and (b) valid as a matter of labor
law.
Allowing employer restaints as broad as the union on the other
side of the labor market makes sense because labor policy requires
that the economic weapons available to employers should be equal
in scope to those available to employees. Thus, it has been uniformly held that all employers negotiating with the same union
and threatened by a whipsaw strike may jointly lock out employees
represented by that union, even though the employers may not all
be members of a multi-employer bargaining unit.2
Although the cases dealing with the terms of union-employer
agreements hold that such agreements may violate the antitrust
laws even if they do not violate the labor laws,27 no case of which I
am aware suggests that joint employer tactics constituting restraints in the labor market in a collective bargaining context may
violate the antitrust laws where they are valid under the labor
laws. Distinguishing terms from tactics is sensible because unionemployer agreements may directly injure third parties in an antitrust sense, but such tactics cannot.
Fifth, what happens to the exemption if the joint employer restraint. constitutes an unfair labor practice is not completely clear,
but again, this question may be answered by Associated General
Contractors.Most cases to date have held that the labor laws displace the antitrust laws in this situation.2 8 This displacement
J 29 and Pennington"
makes sense. Although such cases as Connell
held that union-employer agreements violating both the antitrust
26. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash.
1981); Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
27. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 376 (1965).
28. See, e.g., Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 690 F.2d 489 (5th
Cir. 1982); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F.
Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980). But see California
State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 988 (1982). But see infra note 33.
29. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
30. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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and labor laws are subject to sanctions under both statutes, that
result should not apply here. The preemption argument is much
stronger in cases involving joint employer activity against a union
or employees -

which is the core concern of the labor laws -

than

in challenges by a third party to employer-union combinations.
The labor laws do have something to say about the latter situation,
but only in some circumstances and only peripherally.
Lastly, none of the above applies to restraints in a product market rather than, or in addition to, the labor market. What happens
if a particular restraint is a restraint both in a product market and
in the labor market is not completely clear. This is one of the principle issues in Associated General Contractors.The most sensible
result, in my opinion, and the one that seems most consistent with
the cases, is that the exemption should apply to such a restraint if,
but only if, it is affirmatively protected by those laws. An offensive
or a defensive bargaining lockout would fall into that category, but
a boycott of union-signatory subcontractors, for example, might
not.
With this analysis in mind, let us turn to the issue of whether
multi-employer bargaining lockouts are exempt from the application of the antitrust laws. The principles that govern this issue derive from the question of whether multi-employer bargaining itself
violates the antitrust laws. The courts usually hold that there is
nothing per se special about restraints by employers in the labor
market,3 1 and so, unless some special exemption is created by the
presence of a union, the antitrust laws would apply to multi-employer bargaining. If they did apply, it seems likely that multi-employer bargaining would violate them, because it is, in a sense,
pricefixing.
Of course, no one believes that multi-employer bargaining violates the antitrust laws. On at least three occasions the Supreme
Court has approved the general validity of multi-employer bargaining under the labor laws, and considered the validity of particular tactics. The NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (Buffalo Linen)"a and NLRB v. Brown3 3
cases allowed joint lockouts and temporary replacement of employees by employers within a multi-employer unit in defense to whipsaw strikes, and in Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB,3 4
31.
32.
33.
34.

See supra note 19. But see supra note 17.
353 U.S. 87 (1957).
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
102 S. Ct. 720 (1982).
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decided in January of 1982, it held that a bargaining impasse does
not justify an employer's unilateral withdrawal from a multi-employer unit. It is true that none of these cases involved an antitrust
challenge to the employer's behavior, only a labor law challenge,
but it is unthinkable that the courts would find antitrust liability
to exist in these situations. In Pennington, the Court in dicta
noted that "the law contemplates agreements on wages not only
between individual employers and a union but agreements between
the union and employers in a multi-employer bargaining unit";3 5 in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Volkswagenwerk v. Federal
Maritime Commissione he deemed it "obvious that the employers
are not violating the antitrust laws either when they confer about
wage policy preparatory to bargaining or unless they sign an agreement";17 and Justice Goldberg's dissent in Jewel Tea begins with a
long hymn to multi-employer bargaining. 8 Hence it seems clear
that an exemption of some kind exists.
The dimensions of that exemption are far from clear. It is not
easy to deduce its proper scope, mainly because the theoretical justification for permitting multi-employer bargaining as a matter of
labor law is not clear. The NLRA says next to nothing about
multi-employer bargaining; indeed, it recognizes only "the employer unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." ' 9 However, multiemployer bargaining has always been allowed to take place and, in
fact, predated the NLRA. As a matter of labor law, multi-employer
bargaining is consensual in nature; it can take place only with the
consent of all the participating employers and of the union. In general, it receives official recognition only backhandedly, through the
National Labor Relations Board's refusal to permit employers or
unions to withdraw from an established multi-employer bargaining
structure once negotiations have begun."' Insofar as a rationale can
be inferred, it seems that multi-employer bargaining is allowed primarily on a "countervailing power" theory-that it is only fair to
allow management to present a united front to the union monopoly. This suggests that the scope of the antitrust immunity should
35. 381 U.S. at 664.
36. 390 U.S. 261 (1968).
37. Id. at 287 n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. 381 U.S. at 712-14 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
39. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). Cf. National Labor
Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976). See generally Willborn, A New
Look at NLRB Policy on Multiemployer Bargaining,60 N.C.L. REv. 455 (1982).
40. See Willborn, supra note 39, at 463, 472-78.
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be defined by a "countervailing power" theory as well. As Professor
Areeda puts it, immunity should attach "regardless of the dimensions of the formal bargaining unit . . . for [any] employer combination that is no broader than the union."4 1 The results of the
cases, if not always their reasoning, support this theory.
In the first place, it implies that the exemption only applies to
employer restraints in the labor market, and only when there really is a union on the other side of the labor market. This point
can be illustrated by two separate lines of cases. The first line consists of the cases which hold that employees and competing unions
have a Sherman Act claim against an employer or employers who
support or dominate a sham union.4" The second line consists of
the sports-antitrust cases that suggest that player eligibility, draft,
and reserve restraints adopted unilaterally by management before
a union came into existence, restraints which themselves violate
the antitrust laws, will not be immunized even if agreed to by a
player's union unless the employers can show it was the product of
arm's length bargaining with the union.4" Although the justifications offered by the cases differ, the underlying idea seems to be
that the employer's antitrust exemption is purely derivative, an instance of permissible countervailing power, and so there is no justification for the exemption if there is not any real monopoly power
on the other side of the market to countervail.
In the second place, this "countervailing power" theory suggests
that any multi-employer tactic allowable as a matter of labor law
that restrains primarily the labor market will be exempt from antitrust scrutiny. One such common tactic is the use of strike insurance. Strike insurance has a long history in the United States. At
the turn of the century, trade associations promoted the creation
of actual insurance companies specializing in strike insurance.
There is no commercial insurance market for strike risks today.
Nowadays, strike insurance normally takes the form of pooling arrangements among the members of a given industry whereby the
participants agree to pay a subsidy to cover a portion of the losses
41.

P.

AREEDA

& D.

TURNER,

supra note 2, at 200.

42. Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1976); Carpenters
Dist. Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1973), modified, 539 F.2d
1092 (6th Cir. 1976); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v.
United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir.
1974).
43. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Robertson v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.
1977).
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of the strike firm or firms. One of the most bitterly fought strike
insurance plans was the Mutual Aide Agreement among the major
air carriers, entered into in 1958 and legislated out of existence by
Congress in 1978; but while that agreement was upheld against labor law and antitrust attack before the Civil Aeronautics Board,""
that antitrust ruling was never judicially reviewed. To my knowledge, the only judicial decision involving an antitrust challenge to
a strike insurance pact was Kennedy v. Long Island Railroad,5 in
which the Second Circuit in 1963 upheld, under the Sherman Act
and the Railway Labor Act,"' an insurance pact among twenty-two
railroads covering the fixed costs suffered by any one railroad during the course of a strike. On the antitrust point, the court relied
completely on the theory that the labor market is always per se
immune from antitrust scrutiny.47 Regardless of whether one
agrees with this theory, the result makes sense in terms of the
more limited principles I discussed earlier.
Mutual lockout pacts are another common employer tactic that
is similar in principle: the employers agree that if one of their
number is struck by a union, the rest will lock that union out.
Three cases have considered antitrust challenges to such pacts:
Clune v. Publisher's Association," decided by the Southern District of New York in 1963 and summarily affirmed by the Second
Circuit, in which all the newspaper publishers in New York City
suspended publication after the typographers' union announced a
strike against only some of them; Newspaper Drivers & Handlers
Local 372 v. NLRB,' 9 decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1968, which
invoked a similar situation in Detroit; and very recently, Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris,50 decided by the Eastern District of Washington in 1981, in which three mechanical contractors
locked out the plumbers' union when, after a bargaining impasse,
one contractor was struck. In all three cases the behavior was held
exempt. None of these cases involved offensive lockouts, but nothing in their reasoning necessarily limits their applicability to whipsaw situations. Moreover, the cases have not distinguished between
44. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 972 (1975).
45. 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
47. 319 F.2d at 372-73.
48. 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 314 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1963) (preliminary
injunction denied).
49. 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969).
50. 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash. 1981).
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joint action undertaken by employers who, although faced with the
same union, are not members of a formal multi-employer unit.
That was the situation in both the Plumbers and the Newspaper
Handlers cases.
The hottest topic in this area involves antitrust attacks on employers' anti-union activities or other unfair labor practices. On a
hasty reading, the cases seem to be fundamentally irreconcilable.
The cases involving sham or employer-dominated unions uniformly
permit antitrust attack. 5 1 Other cases have considered antitrust
challenges to alleged unfair labor practices in other contexts, and
most of them apply an antitrust exemption. Prepmore Apparel,
Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers,52 decided by the Fifth
Circuit in 1970, rejected a challenge to an alleged conspiracy to
refuse to deal with the union concerning wage rates and working
conditions. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v.
J.P. Stevens & Co.," decided by the Southern District of New
York in 1979, rejected an antitrust complaint by the Textile Workers' Union that recited every unfair labor practice that J.P. Stevens is alleged to have ever committed in its fight against unionization and averred that those activities had all been done in collusion
with other textile manufacturers, trade associations and others.
CarpentersLocal Union 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth,Inc.," decided
by the Eastern District of Louisiana in 1981, rejected a complaint
alleging that contractors' associations and their members conspired
to restrain trade by use of "open shop" or "double-breasted" contractors. Contrary to the reasoning of these cases is the Ninth Cir5 case which
cuit's decision in the Associated General Contractors"
upheld part of a union complaint similar to that rejected in PrattFarnsworth.
Most of these cases make sense in terms of the analysis
presented here. Although the sham union cases contain some language that could be read to lift the antitrust exemption entirely
when an unfair labor practice is alleged, they are better read as
limited to their facts, and later cases generally have so limited
them. When there is no real union at all on the other side of the
labor market, the "countervailing power" justification for the ex51. See
52. 431
53. 475
54. 511
Cir. 1982).
55. 648

supra note 42.
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 690 F.2d 489 (5th
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
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emption does not exist, and so the exemption should not apply,
regardless of whether the practice is an unfair labor practice or
not. The situation is different when there is a real union on the
other side of the labor market.
Although ConneUl" and Pennington5 7 held that union-employer
agreements violating both the antitrust and labor laws were subject
to both labor law and antitrust sanctions, that result should not
apply to joint employer activity constituting an unfair labor practice that does not involve agreement with the union. Agreement
with a union involves a danger of projecting the union's monopoly
power in ways where the union has no legitimate interest; joint employer restraints in the labor market do not. The argument that
the labor laws preempt the antitrust remedy is much stronger
where the fight is only between an employer and its union, than in
cases where the employer-union collusion is challenged by a third
party. Although the labor laws do have something to say about the
latter situation in some cases, as with hot cargo agreements, they
exhaustively regulate the former situation.
Let us now consider the Associated General Contractorscase. 8
Two District Councils and affiliated Local Unions brought suit
against the Associated General Contractors of California, its
member firms, and unidentified co-conspirators. The most important allegation of the complaint was that AGC and its members
"coerced . . . owners of land and other letters of construction contracts to hire contractors and subcontractors who are not signatories to collective bargaining agreements with [the plaintiff Unions]." 5 That activity was alleged to have restrained trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Unions claimed
treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, but did not
seek injunctive relief against the alleged coercive boycott. The district court dismissed this antitrust claim, but the Ninth Circuit, in
a two-to-one decision, reversed on the ground that the foregoing
allegation adequately charged a group boycott of union-signatory
contractors. It is important to note that the complaint did not
specify the type of coercion employed. The court of appeals rejected the contention that, on a motion to dismiss, it should consider the defendants' claim that the alleged coercive conduct consisted of nothing more than urging resistance to union demands for
56.
57.
58.
59.

421 U.S. 616 (1975).
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
Id. at 531.
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agreements that work be subcontracted only to union-signatory
firms. It did so, however, on the ground that the claim was not a
matter of record.
How should this case be resolved? I believe that it should be
reversed on grounds that the Unions lack standing to recover
treble damages. The parties directly injured by the alleged boycott
are union subcontractors, but none of these firms is a party to this
litigation. Employees should not have standing to challenge restraints in their employer's product market. Indeed the plaintiffs
are not employees, but unions suing in their own right, and their
interest is even less direct since it derives from dues paid to them
by those employees.
If the Court reaches the merits and construes the complaint as
alleging a group boycott of union subcontractors, as did the Ninth
Circuit, that boycott is a direct restraint in the product market
and probably will not be held exempt under the antitrust laws. Although some product restraints, such as lockouts, may be exempt
because they are affirmatively protected under the labor laws, this
type of alleged boycott does not fall into that category. One can
only speculate as to what the outcome of this case might have been
if the defendants had filed a motion for summary judgment rather
than a motion to dismiss.
Now I would like to turn to the legality of dissemination of labor
cost information. Dissemination of labor cost information can have
an effect on two different markets. First, if the participating firms
are in the same product market, such dissemination could have an
effect on that market. Second, such dissemination could have an
effect on the labor market. In the product market, the firms are
sellers, and in the labor market, the firms are buyers. Most information-exchange cases have involved competing sellers, rather
than buyers, but the underlying vice - pricefixing - is equally
culpable whether buyers or sellers are fixing the price. Hence the
same analysis will apply to both markets.
First, consider the possible effect of exchange of information
about labor costs on the product market, with the firms in the role
of sellers. Labor is usually only one of many inputs that go into a
given product, and so information about a firm's costs usually gives
no useful clue about the details of its product prices or output.
When that is the case, such information cannot serve as an effective invitation to pricefixing or as a means of policing an interdependent pricing system. It is true that the cases have condemned
exchanges of some kinds of information besides prices, but only
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those that can have an equivalent anti-competitive effect if subject
to agreement or interdependent behavior. Information about output or pricing formulas is obviously as sensitive as prices themselves in this sense.
It is possible that exchange of certain kinds of cost information
could serve as an effective invitation to pricefixing. For instance,
reports by individual firms of "average cost per product" would be
a natural focal point for pricing, especially since such a figure is
susceptible to padding and difficult to police. But a report of how
much employees in each job category are being paid, even aggregated for each firm, would rarely have such a relationship to the
firm's prices or outputs as to be able to convey much information
on those subjects to its competitors. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in its Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v.United
States opinion, 60 specifically stated that "[tihe cost of production
. . . [is a] legitimate subject of inquiry and knowledge in any industry."'" I do not believe there is any substantial danger of antitrust liability from this direction in any scheme of exchanging information about labor costs, no matter how detailed, even on a
firm-by-firm basis. The exception would be in those cases where
labor cost alone or together with other exchanged costs, bore a
close relationship to price or output of the firm's products. In such
cases, labor cost can be legitimately disseminated through a third
party with the identity of the reporting firm withheld.
A more interesting question is the effect of exchange of labor
cost information by firms in their role. as buyers of labor - that is,
the effect on the labor market. Where employers are unionized,
their action in making wage surveys or exchanging wage information is undoubtedly exempt from the application of the antitrust
laws because it is a necessary ancillary to effective collective bargaining. On the other hand, wage surveys by nonunion firms or exchanges of wage data by nonunion firms may not be entitled to the
same exemption. They may be legal, but they are probably not exempt from the application of the antitrust laws. In any event, such
wage surveys or exchanges of information should be done through
third parties, with the identity of the responding employers
masked or deleted.
What about surveys of executive compensation or exchanges of
information on executive compensation? Under the current state
60. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
61. Id. at 585.
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of the law, there is probably no antitrust difficulty in such surveys
or exchanges of information unless they are part of a broader
scheme of fixing, or agreeing upon, executive compensation among
competitors or have the effect of a stabilizing such compensation.
Nevertheless, it is obviously safer to handle such surveys or exchanges of information through third parties, such as trade
associations.
I would like to conclude this talk by discussing the very recent
decision of the Fourth Circuit in the National Electrical Contractors case.62 The plaintiffs in that case were electrical contractors
who were members of the National Contractors Association, a relatively small trade association. The defendants were the National
Electrical Contractors Association (NECA), the largest trade association in the electrical contracting industry and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). The basis for the action was a provision in the national agreement between the IBEW
and NECA which, as read by the court, required the IBEW to include an industry advancement fund clause in substantially all labor contracts the IBEW entered into in the electrical industry.
The clause required all employers to contribute one percent of
their gross labor payroll to a trust administered by NECA. Apart
from going to defray NECA's costs of negotiating and administering the national agreement, the trust fund was used to cover any
expenses the trustees deemed to be for "industry advancement [or]
services rendered to the electrical contracting industry."6 3 These
expenses would include product advertising, lobbying, and industry relations with architects, builders, and owners.
However, neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit inquired into the purpose or use of the fund, because both decided
that this was pricefixing and illegal per se under the antitrust laws.
The courts did not inquire into whether the industry advancement
fund would have passed antitrust muster if contributions had been
completely voluntary. Rather, they simply reasoned that, because
non-NECA contractors who in the past did not have to bear the
costs of industry advancement had a cost advantage over NECA
members who did, an agreement that required them to pay into
such a fund (and thereby removed from that competitive advantage) constituted pricefixing.
Because it characterized the agreement as pricefixing, the Fourth
62.
63.

678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 496.
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Circuit decided that the purpose and effect of the agreement were
irrelevant. The plaintiffs had demanded both treble damages and
an injunction. The case was decided on a motion for summary
judgment. The courts did not reach the issue of damages, but an
injunction was issued restraining enforcement of that clause of the
collective bargaining agreement and restraining any of the defendants from soliciting any contributions to the fund by nonmembers
of NECA. The court of appeals modified the injunction slightly on
appeal so that it would not restrain the IBEW from soliciting or
demanding contributions to the fund if the IBEW did not act in
combination with a nonlabor group.
The court was probably correct in the law it applied. The agreement has elements of pricefixing, in that it jointly sets certain
costs, and of a horizontal boycott, in coercing competitors to agree.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,64 only improvement in competition can justify such horizontal restraints. Although the agreement
prevents non-NECA contractors from getting a free ride on
NECA's collective bargaining efforts, that is not a competitive justification, and so, if one takes the ProfessionalEngineers case seriously, that justification is insufficient to validate the restraint.
The defendants' petition for rehearing en banc was denied by
the Fourth Circuit on September 8, 1982.65 I understand that they
intend to seek review by the Supreme Court. If so, it behooves us
to watch for the Supreme Court's disposition of the case.

64.
65.

435 U.S. 679 (1978).
689 F.2d 1199 (4th Cir. 1982).

